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NO. 61 DECEMBER 2020 Introduction 
A New Beginning with President Biden 
Five German and European Priorities for the Transatlantic Agenda 
Laura von Daniels, Markus Kaim, Ronja Kempin, Kai-Olaf Lang, Marco Overhaus, and Johannes Thimm 
Although Joseph Biden has now been elected 46th president of the United States, 
transatlantic relations do not automatically revert to their pre-2017 status quo. Too 
much has changed in the international sphere, too central has great power competi-
tion become to the international order. Europe will have to be much more clear than 
in the past about what it expects from Washington – and what it is prepared to 
contribute. Berlin and Brussels should work toward a new transatlantic agenda with 
the Biden administration, with five priorities including joint action against political 
disinformation and a transatlantic vaccine alliance. 
 
Joseph Biden’s victory in the presidential 
election on 3 November 2020 leaves Ger-
man and European decision-makers hoping 
for a normalization of transatlantic rela-
tions and a reduction in the number of 
conflicts between the United States, Ger-
many and other EU states. These are pressing 
matters, given that the United States will 
continue to play a central role in guarantee-
ing Europe’s security and prosperity. After 
Donald Trump plumbed new depths in the 
European-American relationship, it is time 
for a new beginning. 
Transatlantic relations in a world 
of great power rivalries 
Germany and Europe face a two-stage chal-
lenge here. Firstly, they need to rapidly 
clarify and prioritize their interests in the 
policy areas where transatlantic coopera-
tion is relevant. Secondly, rather than wait-
ing for American proposals and initiatives 
they should approach Washington with 
offers designed to explore the possibilities 
of transatlantic cooperation under the new 
circumstances. The priorities can be sub-
sumed into five policy areas. The objectives 
laid out below are modest, comparatively 
uncontroversial on both sides of the Atlantic, 
and of great urgency for the European 
Union. 
Although the early signs are that Presi-
dent Biden will largely revert to a policy of 
partnerships and alliances, this will occur 
in a very different context. Cooperation will 
likely be subjugated to the strategic rivalry 
between major global powers or, to put it 
bluntly: instrumentalized by Washington 
for its systemic conflict with Beijing. Today 
the stances of the Democrats and Republi-
cans toward Beijing are almost indistin-
guishable. During the campaign, Biden 
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described China as a major geopolitical 
and technological rival. His trade policy – 
like his predecessor’s – will be judged on 
whether it generates tangible benefits for 
Americans in the lower and middle income 
groups. Biden’s election slogans “Buy Ameri-
can” and “Make it in America” suggest that 
protectionist elements will feature promi-
nently in his economic and trade policy. But 
he sees the EU as a partner against China 
on the basis of shared interests and values. 
This could potentially lead to a revival 
of the concept of “the West”. In the present 
geopolitical situation, this threatens to con-
strain the options open to Germany and the 
European Union. The Biden administration 
will likely expect more unambiguous back-
ing from Berlin and Brussels on important 
issues than has been the case in the past 
four years. This applies for example to the 
question of Chinese participation in the de-
velopment of 5G cellular networks. Greater 
opportunities for cooperation with Washing-
ton would probably mean less latitude vis-à-
vis China and higher economic and politi-
cal costs. 
President Biden’s domestic 
political constraints 
The “blue wave” that the Democrats hoped 
would win them the Senate and increase 
their majority in the House of Representa-
tives failed to materialize. The best they can 
hope in the Senate for is parity, even if they 
win the two run-offs in Georgia. Vice Presi-
dent Kamala Harris would then hold the 
casting vote. In the House of Representa-
tives the Democrats suffered a net loss of 
seats but retained their majority. President 
Biden will thus not have a free hand, espe-
cially given the possibilities for obstruction 
available to minorities in the US political 
system. 
The President’s domestic and foreign 
policy options will also be affected by long-
term trends that do not fit neatly into one 
or two terms. Growing political polarization 
has eroded bipartisanship in Congress, 
with potentially negative effects on the 
legislative work. Especially where major-
ities are slim it will be difficult to get im-
portant legislation passed at all. Trump’s 
good showing, with 74 million votes in 
2020 – 11 million more than in 2016 – 
will do nothing to encourage the Repub-
licans to cooperate. 
The Covid-19 pandemic looks set to 
worsen socioeconomic inequalities and 
social divisions and further constrict 
Biden’s foreign policy options. In direct 
terms, pandemic response in all its facets 
will be the first priority; more broadly, 
US public support for costly international 
engagements and alliance obligations has 
never been unconditional. It has always 
also rested on a credible political promise to 
improve social and economic inclusion and 
equality of opportunities. 
The dollar’s unique status in the inter-
national financial system has historically 
made borrowing easier for the United States 
than for other states. But the pandemic 
now leaves the country with an enormous 
budget deficit in combination with a his-
toric level of debt. These developments 
could generate pressure in Congress to 
return to a balanced budget and reduce the 
debt. That would narrow the leeway for 
state spending, not least in foreign, security 
and defense policy. 
1. Transatlantic economic policy 
President Biden and Vice President Harris 
have put forth a socially and ecologically 
sustainable economic growth strategy to 
put an end to the proliferation of economic 
protectionism and nationalism in the US 
and abroad. Both support working through 
multilateral institutions and negotiations. 
This applies especially – but not only – to 
economic and climate policy. The European 
Commission has already published a plan 
for European growth and economic restruc-
turing, the European Green Deal. Not only 
are there overlaps between the Green Deal 
and Biden’s plans; simultaneous implemen-
tation of measures by Washington and 
Brussels could generate synergies. But if the 
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transatlantic relationship is to advance a 
green economic policy, the United States 
and the European Union will need to 
achieve greater agreement in three fields: 
trade policy, energy policy and digital 
policy. 
Trade policy: Here the German and Euro-
pean interest is deescalation of the existing 
trade conflicts with Washington. Europeans 
would like to see Trump’s tariffs on steel 
and aluminum and other products lifted, 
allowing the EU Commission to then lift 
its own retaliatory tariffs. In bilateral trade 
talks the European Commission could offer 
the Biden administration new sectoral tariff 
agreements. Later on, both sides could agree 
on more regulatory cooperation.  
Regarding the unfilled post of director-
general at the WTO, the European Commis-
sion should approach Biden's economic 
team and advocate for his future adminis-
tration to back the candidate with the 
broadest support, the Nigerian Ngozi 
Okonjo-Iweala. But most importantly, the 
system of impartial, two-stage dispute 
settlement that represents the heart of the 
WTO system also needs to be reestablished. 
Modernizing the WTO rules to fit the 
changing global economy is of great impor-
tance to both the United States and the 
European Union. This applies above all to 
trade in digital goods and services. Finally, 
it is also in the EU’s interest to negotiate 
with the United States and China in the 
WTO framework to develop new rules on 
state subsidies and better procedures for 
enforcing them. Brussels should also call 
on Washington to return to the negotia-
tions on central plurilateral agreements 
(for example on services and medical goods) 
within the WTO. 
Energy policy: Brussels should establish 
a high-level dialog with the Biden adminis-
tration to explain why a sovereign and sus-
tainable European energy policy is both 
necessary and desirable. The discussions 
should not be restricted to the sanctions 
imposed by Washington in connection with 
the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. Washing-
ton and Brussels need a comprehensive 
exchange on their respective energy policy 
concepts and their compatibility with the 
Paris Climate Agreement. One option to 
strengthen the Biden administration vis-à-
vis Congress would be for Germany to place 
a moratorium on the Nord Stream 2 project, 
because the legislation on which the cur-
rent sanctions are based was passed with 
bipartisan majorities in both chambers. 
Until the Russian-American relationship 
improves, a relaxation of the measures is 
unlikely. In this case the German govern-
ment will achieve more if it sets the imme-
diate self-interest aside. 
Digital policy: Berlin and Brussels are 
keen to promote the development of digital 
enterprises, especially in terms of their 
innovative capacity and economic contribu-
tion, but also to beef up regulation to safe-
guard European data standards and defend 
the interests of European businesses and 
consumers vis-à-vis the digital platforms. 
The EU should approach the Biden adminis-
tration to offer a dialog on the future of the 
digital economy. In this context Brussels 
should urge Washington to drop the Trump 
administration’s demands for a comprehen-
sive decoupling from China and instead 
develop a coordinated joint approach to im-
prove the resilience of businesses against 
Chinese economic aggression. Such a dialog 
should also offer a forum to discuss data pro-
tection standards, competition law, digital 
platforms and taxation of digital services. 
2. Action against disinformation 
Domestic and foreign disinformation is a 
growing issue on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Both Europe and the United States accuse 
Russia and China in particular of circulat-
ing falsehoods in order to influence politi-
cal decisions and deepen social faultlines. 
The EU charges both with endangering 
the health of the European population 
with “fake news” about Covid-19. Moscow’s 
interference in the 2016 US presidential 
elections was a wake-up call for Washing-
ton. 
Although the EU and the United States 
face the same challenges, they respond 
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differently. The European Commission and 
the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy increased 
their funding for fact-checkers and research-
ers from June 2020. Brussels also requires 
online platforms to report the action they 
take against disinformation campaigns 
concerning Covid-19 on a monthly basis. 
The platforms are required to disclose their 
internal rules and to document cases of 
misleading information and malign influ-
ence, including aspects relating to adver-
tising. Finally, the Commission plans to 
modernize the legal framework for digital 
services and online platforms, which is 
twenty years old. It plans to publish pro-
posals for a package of legislation by the 
end of 2020. 
In the United States regulation of the 
major platforms was prevented not least 
by President Trump – who used them to 
disseminate his own falsities. He also sup-
pressed findings of his own intelligence 
services concerning Russia’s role in Ameri-
can elections. Under growing public pres-
sure in the United States the platforms 
themselves are currently introducing regu-
latory elements. Facebook for example 
recently deleted pages and accounts linked 
to the QAnon conspiracy theory and is also 
taking action against Holocaust deniers. 
Like Twitter before it, Facebook recently 
chose to place warnings on posts by Donald 
Trump, adding labels to his statements on 
Covid-19 and mail-in voting fraud question-
ing their accuracy and directing users to 
more reliable sources. 
It is safe to assume that the Biden admin-
istration will take the phenomenon of dis-
information considerably more seriously 
than its predecessor – not least because the 
Democrats have largely been on the receiv-
ing end. Biden is also likely to be less reti-
cent about naming Russian interference 
and taking action to stop it. On the other 
hand it is unclear whether he would risk 
confrontation with Silicon Valley, where 
decisive action would have repercussions 
on lucrative business models. 
For all the difficulties involved, closer 
cooperation between the United States 
and Europe in this field would be mutually 
advantageous. If the two sides are able 
to between the American and German 
understandings of freedom of speech and 
its limits, that could open the door to more 
balanced solutions that find greater 
acceptance in the EU member states. Despite 
occasional setbacks, Europe’s efforts to 
strengthen society’s resilience against dis-
information, for example through publicly 
funded media outlets, could also be of in-
terest to the United States. The EU’s efforts 
to regulate US-based internet companies 
would be a good deal more effective if they 
enjoyed Washington’s support, while uni-
form rules would benefit the affected firms. 
In some instances the two sides’ regulatory 
approaches could be complementary, and 
EU-US technology summit could launch 
a process of standardizing procedures to 
counter disinformation. 
3. A transatlantic vaccine alliance 
The first vaccines against the SARS-CoV2 
virus are expected to become available in 
winter 2020/2021. European and American 
companies will be competing for the profits 
while states will seek broad and rapid access 
for their citizens. The pandemic provides a 
striking illustration of the extent to which 
health policy can become an instrument of 
international geopolitics. At the beginning 
of the crisis countries like China and Tur-
key gained kudos for supplying protective 
equipment, while the United States and the 
European Union drifted apart. One reason 
for this was Washington’s withdrawal from 
the World Health Organization (WHO). But 
overt provocations were also involved, to 
which the EU responded robustly: In March 
2020 the Trump Administration attempted 
to secure exclusive rights to a vaccine devel-
oped by a German firm. Treating vaccines 
as a public good, the Commission launched 
the Coronavirus Global Response initiative, 
which numerous third states, organizations 
and enterprises have joined. 
It organized a pledging summit to raise 
funds to fight the pandemic and its con-
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sequences. Contributions totaling almost 
€16 billion were committed at the summit 
in June 2020. Funding has gone in the first 
place to the WHO, as well as state, non-
profit and private-sector groups working to 
develop treatments and vaccines. The Com-
mission has also provided €9.8 billion to 
enable states in the EU’s immediate neigh-
borhood to access Covid-19 vaccines, treat-
ments and tests. 
Here the Commission is pursuing three 
objectives: to strengthen multilateralism, 
to stabilize the EU’s neighborhood and to 
limit China’s influence. Given that all three 
are also in the interest of the future US ad-
ministration, they offer an opening for Ger-
many and the EU. Brussels and Washington 
should establish a transatlantic vaccine 
alliance at the first possible opportunity. 
Its purpose would be to secure access to a 
Covid-19 vaccine for all the world’s popu-
lation. In a second step the two sides 
should then agree a global health agenda 
to strengthen health systems in third states 
and improve their ability to cope with 
crises. Here it would be advisable to identify 
and prioritize countries and regions of geo-
political importance for the West. 
4. Contain Russia and stabilize 
the European neighborhood 
Relations with Russia and policies towards 
the countries of the eastern neighborhood 
of the EU and NATO will remain a central 
element of the European-American and 
German-American relationships. Biden’s 
Russia policy is based on the idea that Mos-
cow is an “adversary” of America, seeking 
to weaken – if not ultimately to destroy – 
NATO and the EU. Containing Russian 
influence will therefore be a guiding prin-
ciple of his administration – backed, how-
ever, by a nuanced understanding of how 
this containment should be organized and 
practiced. Firstly, Washington’s future Rus-
sia policy will in all likelihood be discussed 
and conducted jointly with the European 
allies; not merely with a handful of selected 
partners and within NATO, but potentially 
also with the EU. Secondly, the differences 
on these issues that existed between Trump’s 
White House and actors like the State 
Department, the Pentagon the US armed 
forces are likely to diminish, while leaving 
behind the uncertainty that surrounded 
Trump’s erratic appointment practice will 
also improve the prospects of continuity 
and unity. Thirdly, there will no longer 
be any basis for speculation that a special 
personal relationship between the Ameri-
can and Russian presidents could lead to a 
deal to the detriment of Ukraine or other 
Eastern European states. US policy can thus 
be expected to become more dependable. 
Is unclear, however, to what extent the 
two vectors of Russia policy present in 
the Biden camp can be reconciled. On the 
one hand, the future president underlines 
the importance of disarmament and arms 
control. This sends a message that trans-
cends specific issues; the new administra-
tion is interested in detente and in dealing 
cooperatively with Russia (albeit from a 
position of strength). One important first 
indication will be the stance the president-
elect adopts on the New-START nuclear 
arms reduction treaty that expires at the 
beginning of February 2021. In advance of 
the elections Biden signaled his openness 
to extending the treaty temporarily to allow 
negotiations with Russia. On the other hand 
Biden’s advisers also include advocates of 
a value-based democratization policy for 
eastern Europe. If this position gains the 
upper hand, in a context of geopolitical 
containment, tensions with Russia can be 
expected to heighten. 
There will be openings for Germany and 
the EU to renew the dialog with Washing-
ton or even to achieve deeper cooperation. 
Although little of substance is likely to 
change in Washington’s policy on Russia 
and Eastern Europe, the next administra-
tion will be more open to working through 
coordination within (rather than avoidance 
of) alliances and also in exchange with 
(rather than opposition to) the EU, and par-
ticularly Germany. This should generate 
clarity on shared interests. Like the United 
States, Germany and its European partners 
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are concerned to enhance the security and 
resilience of the countries that form NATO’s 
eastern flank. In line with a strengthening 
of transatlantic relations, Berlin is interested 
in discussing this in the NATO framework, 
also for the sake of stemming the bilateral-
isation of security created by Washington’s 
proliferating special relationships with 
selected partners. At the same time the EU 
could enter into a structured dialog with 
Washington on improving resilience in soft 
security questions. If Biden’s administration 
chooses to pursue arms control with Russia, 
that would serve Berlin’s preference for a 
dual strategy of deterrence and detente. Ger-
many and the EU are also interesting in ad-
vancing free-market and democratic reforms 
beyond the EU’s eastern external border. 
In that respect Germany could offer the 
new administration an enhanced European-
American policy on Russia and Eastern 
Europe, which would include reform and 
economic dimensions as well as security. 
Such an offer should encompass meaning-
ful diplomatic activities. The Chancellery 
and the White House or the foreign minis-
ters could initiate a German-American dia-
log to explore both sides’ strategic objec-
tives in the eastern neighborhood of NATO 
and the EU, and to foster synergies in exist-
ing and future activities in the region. 
It would also make sense to establish a 
working group on infrastructures, with the 
participation of the foreign and economics 
ministries of the United States, Germany 
and selected eastern and south-eastern 
European countries. Such a forum could 
discuss transport-related, energy-related 
and digital infrastructure projects and 
priorities in the eastern regions of the EU 
and in its eastern neighborhood, as well as 
considering how countries in the eastern 
neighborhood and the Western Balkans can 
be better connected to the EU’s infrastruc-
ture networks and where American support 
offers added value for improving infrastruc-
ture resilience. Germany should also offer 
to contribute more actively to Washington’s 
existing transatlantic energy partnership 
with countries in the Three Seas Initia-
tive – a cooperation framework between 
twelve EU member states bordering the 
Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black Sea. In 
this context Germany should step up its 
support for energy infrastructure develop-
ment in Eastern Europe – without drop-
ping its longer-term objective of having 
the Nord Stream 2 sanctions dropped or 
amended to a point where the project can 
go ahead. If the German government wishes 
to preserve Nord Stream 2 it should – along-
side renewing its commitment to European 
energy solidarity – offer to support the 
Eastern Europeans on energy issues jointly 
with the United States. 
5. Iran nuclear deal: 
return to diplomacy 
During the campaign, Biden offered to 
rejoin the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) if 
Tehran returns to full compliance itself. 
Such a move by Washington would 
acknowledge the significance of multi-
lateral agreements and confirm Europe’s 
foreign policy role. European governments 
should not delay in urging the Biden-
administration to undertake a new diplo-
matic initiative toward Iran. If it does 
return to the JCPOA, Washington is likely 
to demand a follow-up agreement covering 
two sets of problems on which it is in con-
sensus with European capitals. These are 
the Iranian missile program and Tehran’s 
support for terrorist activities, where its 
proxies destabilize the neighborhood. How-
ever, it would be unrealistic to expect a 
complete reversal of Iran’s regional policy. 
Tehran will insist on dependable guaran-
tees that Washington lift its sanctions and 
could demand compensation for the eco-
nomic harm they have caused. 
The change of president permits Europe 
to return to cooperation with Washington 
and to shift the focus of its Iran policy away 
from efforts to save the JCPOA and toward 
developing a new transatlantic approach to 
Tehran. Rapidly preparing the ground for 
direct talks between Iran and the United 
States must be one component of European 
policy, also making greater use of diplomatic 
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channels to Tehran to prepare Iran’s return 
to full implementation of the JCPOA and to 
underline the need for a follow-up agree-
ment. 
Europe should urge Iran and Washing-
ton to adopt a graduated approach to ease 
the transition to talks. The initial objective 
would be an interim agreement with Iran at 
least freezing its nuclear activities in return 
for concrete economic concessions. At the 
same time, Washington’s extraterritorial 
sanctions would need to be suspended. 
The next steps 
These five priorities could form the basis 
for a European contribution to a new trans-
atlantic agenda. Given that they all lie in 
Germany’s interest, Berlin should grasp the 
opportunity offered by the final weeks of its 
Council Presidency and communicate the 
package to its EU partners. If the European 
capitals can rapidly coordinate and make 
any necessary amendments, the European 
Commission and the European Council 
could signal their interest in cooperation 
before Biden’s inauguration on 20 January. 
The Commission and the Council are key: 
If Europe is to speak with a single voice 
on foreign policy, it does not want to see 
a parade of national politicians making 
uncoordinated overtures to Washington. 
The next step would be to think about 
creating a better institutional structure for 
the dialog between the United States and 
the European Union, complementary to 
NATO. The EU’s ways and means for actively 
shaping the future relationship with 
Washington are comparatively underdevel-
oped. Permanent and issue-specific dialog 
formats corresponding to the portfolios of 
the EU Commissioners should form the 
basis of the new transatlantic agenda. 
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